CNR – Analysis Retracked

The reference to Retracked means to go over a prior section of rail track to make repairs or adjustments. This post is about me revising prior views.

Since I last wrote about CNR in August, the price has run up about 10% and floated back down to ~$155/sh. I’ve also listened to over three dozen hours of investing podcasts* and read several investing books.

Guy Spier happened to feature in quite a few of these. He runs the Aquamarine fund, which averaged 9% CAGR since inception. A solid, steady return. Not remarkable compared to Buffet or the Nomad Partnership, but it still beats the index and when that annual difference is compounded over decades, it makes a significant positive impact.

Listening to Guy and others, I came upon a concept that is a mix of probability and spirituality. I won’t do the explanation justice, but it’s along the lines of considering our decisions and life on a path of a 1000 possibilities, and making decisions that would result in a positive expected value in the majority of them. Put another way, in the context of investing, one might do really well with leverage – this time. In another possible life, it may ruin us. In a similar vein, always striving for huge returns may work out well, but it may lead us to taking larger risks that lead us to ruin (capital loss). It’s similar to what Annie Duke talks about in her books Quit and Thinking in Bets.

It made me reconsider the somewhat absolute statement I made when I evaluated CNR at a similar price to where it is now. Firstly, I said it wasn’t market beating, so I would avoid it. Specifically, that an 8-12% CAGR was insufficient. Secondly, I wrote the article after reading someone else’s post about CNR not being an attractive investment, clearly biasing my own views in the interest of publishing something provocative. Thirdly, when I calculated my own returns from CNR, I only considered the share price appreciation of ~7.7% CAGR. I didn’t consider the dividends, which add another ~2% to that and bring total returns to nearly 10% CAGR.

I asked myself, knowing what I’ve learned in the past three months, what do I think now? Well, doubling my investment every 7 years? In a business I consider high quality and irreplaceable? That’s nothing to sneeze at. Can’t say I like the increasing leverage, partly to fund those big share buybacks, but I think it was partly in response to the Kansas City acquisition by CP in 2021 to give shareholders a reward of sorts. Even if I would have preferred them not to lever up. Having said that, their leverage target is 2.5x, which they are sitting roughly at now as a result, so it may have been merely taking advantage of spare borrowing capacity supported by their fairly robust underlying business results. It’s something I’m going to keep an eye in any case.

In my prior article, I also thought it was not realistic to assume current multiples would expand back to historic levels. That’s a reasonably safe assumption, insofar as then any expansion is “gravy” if the price one buys at is sufficiently attractive such that returns don’t rely on expansion. That hasn’t changed.

What I didn’t consider, however, was another source of returns: share buybacks. CNR buys about 1-2% of shares annually and reduced its share count by 2.5% CAGR over the past decade.

As I thought more about CNR, I considered the three engines of value: earnings, multiple expansion, and share buybacks. Thanks to John Huber of Saber Capital Management for this framework (link). [Note – I think he misses dividends, so I consider them alongside share buybacks in a ‘shareholder capital return’ bucket].

All this to say, I reconsidered my earlier posture against CNR and have come to the conclusion that at these prices, it is compelling as a solid base to my portfolio. Am I fairly certain about this outcome? Yes. Arguably, I should overweight my investment in it, as compared to a more speculative position.

It’s about positioning to win in the long-term, in the greatest number of possible paths my life might take me.

And why not? This track record (pun intended?) is enviable:

Based on the Q3 guidance for 7% dividend growth, high single digit EPS growth for 3 years, and assuming 1% buyback annually with the P/E unchanged at ~18x presently, the CAGR is 9.5-11.5% based on 6%/8% EPS CAGR. Add a mere 2x increase in the multiple closer to historic average of 20x, we’re looking at 13-15%. The way CNR intends to grow at this GDP+ rate is through own initiatives. These include: i) Expanding at the ports of Vancouver, Prince Rupert, and possibly Montreal, Halifax and St. John, ii) taking advantage of their owned bypass rail around Chicago (speeding up transit times up to 48hrs faster than those who have to go thru the city), iii) introducing automation e.g. Autonomous track inspection cars that run in regular routes, autonomous inspection portals, and handheld tech for field staff, and iv) implementing and sticking to scheduled railroading, which enables them to quickly recover after incidents (like the stoppage due to the fire in Jasper). From the 2023 investor day, as reported in Progressive Railroading (which is not PBR nor focused on making the longest possible trains):

β€œThe way this model works on our railroad is that the plan is created at the center. [It] looks at all the volume across the network and all the parameters,” said CN President and CEO Tracy Robinson during investor day.

Then, a plan is crafted that can optimize the entire network instead of meeting the operating needs of individual yards and facilities. And the plan is the plan β€” there is no backup or alternative.

I admit it seems contradictory to write a different position on the same stock a mere three months later, but I’ve learned a lot in this intervening period. Plus, the whole point of committing my thoughts to (virtual) paper is to record my thinking process, and that evolution over time. This reminds me of John Maynard Keynes – “When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?”

Consequently, I bought some more shares around $154.

* The combination of a long commute and training myself to listen at 2x speed means I can devour audio. Another example of the power of compounding. Try it out.

CNR – Smoke but no fire, still overvalued

My first post! I haven’t yet set a standard template for company analysis, but I intend to do so to help keep things organized. I will also include charts to help convey what I am evaluating. I plan on starting my blog by reviewing my holdings in a series of posts.

Overview

I’ve held CNR since July 2015. It’s done fairly well for me in terms of dividend growth (11.7% CAGR) but less stellar in terms of share price appreciation (approx 7.6% CAGR). I’m now trying to view my investments with a value lens and with news of a strike on the horizon earlier this year, I thought it might be a buying opportunity. Shares have come off the their earlier highs of ~$178/sh to trade around $155/sh, down about 15%. I like CNR as a company with its wide moat – those railroads aren’t going to be replicated – and decent operating returns (+/- 15% ROIC) and, in my view, a safe dividend payer (FCF dividend payout around 50-60%). I almost added to my position this year with that view in mind but tried to put a valuation lens on it and passed. My conclusion is that I don’t think the share price is low enough .

In the short-term, while I’m worried about the strike of course, I don’t think it will be a drawn out issue considering the significant of labour disruption on the supply chain. There may even be legislative solutions implemented when the Feds return to the Fall session, if it comes to it. I won’t ruminate on what might happen if the strike runs a long time. In itself, it was already a known factor. This is how I came to my conclusion and decided to pass on adding more at the moment.

Setting the Context

What I saw was that the share price run up in 2024 came mainly from multiple expansion (both P/E, P/OCF). The underlying performance was pretty stable; $6.8-7B OCF and $5-5.5B earnings. I’m giving a range because I’m scanning TTM metrics over a few quarters.

Going back 5 years, the CAGR is about 4% for earnings and 2% for OCF. Neither are stellar, but shouldn’t be surprising, because it’s a railroad that is the backbone of the economy, not a tech growth stock.

As of late August, both multiples are sitting around the median: 18x actual PE vs. 20.7x median and 14.3x actual P/OCF vs. 15.5x median. Yes, perhaps a little cheap by historical standards but not much of a discount.

Freeform analysis of CNR over the past 5 years through August 2024, on Stock Unlock. Showing OCF, FCF, share price, P/OCF, P/FCF and P/E.

Stock Unlock: Free Form tool for CNR

This is a good candidate to value based on FCF since its fairly steady despite $2.5-4B of investments per year. The story is the same in terms where the multiples sit. In the past 5 years FCF has grown at a good clip of 12% p.a., but stock price has only moved at ~4% CAGR, so P/FCF has shrunk by 6% p.a. (!!). Maybe there is an argument for multiple expansion? The 27.5x P/FCF multiple is a bit below 30x median and still high off the 22x low from last year. Unfortunately, FCF itself is also trending down, due to a double whammy of higher capex and lower OCF.

A lot of their cargo is commodity based and at the moment, on a quarterly basis it seems to have flatlined (pet chems, metals/minerals,  grain and fertilizers, coal, freight and automotive). Some very slight growth in intermodal and forest products:+

KPI for CNR, showing quarterly revenue by product from 2019 through 2Q24.

Stock Unlock: KPI for CNR as of 2Q24 (pulled Aug’24).

I don’t see the underlying part of the multiples growing at the moment. Especially not with my concerns over the consumer. By which I mean too much mortgage, car and credit card debt that will dampen demand now that excess Covid-era savings have been used up. Industrial activity is fairly anemic too, according to declining Purchasing Manager Indices in both Canada and US; I still think the IRA in the US will provide a secular tailwind but at the moment the investment isn’t yet happening in a big way. CNR even mentioned on their July Q2 earnings call both softness domestically and oversupply of truck capacity leading to lower revenue per track mile, with further expected challenges due to the then-anticipated strike.

Valuation

Using the DCF calculator on Stock Unlock, and if I merely assume historic performance over the next 5 years (growth and average price ratios), we get 8% CAGR and a FV of ~$145/sh on a OCF basis and almost 13% CAGR on an earnings basis with a FV of ~$178/sh. If we believe guidance of mid-to-high single digit earnings growth, say 7.5%, then share price CAGR is nearly 16%…if they can sustain that for the next 5 years and P/E ratio expands back to the 5 year average of 21.9x from 18x currently.

Then it starts to look really attractive on a FCF basis assuming historic growth rates, with a FV of almost $230/sh and nearly 19% CAGR. I don’t believe it, though. Capex has run up about 6% p.a. since the Pandemic and see my comments above about demand. Multiples also have to expand, and recently, OCF has tumbled a bit. Part of the longer historic price run up was the company’s move to precision based railroading (PBR), and more recently since 2020/Pandemic, pent up demand driving volumes and helping push up all results.

Arguably CNR moved away from the intensity of PBR in recent years and could do a bit more to eke out better margins, driving up OCF and earnings, but I don’t think there is a lot of excess cost to trim without sacrificing operations and safety. Searching online already reveals many news articles about those issues; indeed that’s part of what the strike is about.

Concluding Remarks / Actions

CNR doesn’t fit my value-objective at these prices because I don’t think it’s compellingly cheap. Reasonably priced? Yes, probably, but not market beating. Conversely, I don’t think it’s significantly overpriced so I won’t sell my main holding for now. I have a small position in a side account and will swap that for BN.

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